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In 1984, the Federal Sentencing Reform Act was signed into law. This act of reformation
set a new standard of mandatory minimum federal sentencing guidelines for anyone who was
convicted of an unlawful crime. Under the Federal Sentencing Reform Act, Congress created a
new agency, the United States Sentencing Commission. As a bi-partisan, independent agency,
the United States Sentencing Commission set the standard of guidelines with the objective to
decrease unwarranted disparities within the federal system. Federal Supreme Court cases like
United States v Booker overturned federal guidelines moving them mandatory to advisory based
on a Sixth Amendment violation. With the reform guidelines already evidently impacting the
federal judicial system, research has explored extralegal factors and actively works towards
identifying other disparities. To expand on this forum, research is leaning into measuring
prosecutorial and judicial discretion within sentencing. The objective of this research paper is to
examine how research has used extralegal factors, legal discretion, and policy reform to analyze
federal sentencing disparities.
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HEADING 1
ESTABLISHMENT OF FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
In 1984, Congress, the Executive and the Judicial branch produced a plan to implement
strict guidelines to deter crime. This act, known as the Federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
began a new standard of federal sentencing. Any defendant who was in violation of a federal crime
now faces mandatory sentencing guidelines for any crime they are found guilty of under the
Federal statute. Not only did this federal act lay down the law but it also created a new political
institution. Within the boundaries of the Federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (S. 668 (98th)),
the United States Sentencing Commission (U.S.S.C.) was created.
The United States Sentencing Commission was created with the sole purpose of
establishing guidelines for federal sentencing. On one hand, past research has openly considered
the data available examining independent and intersectional extralegal factors on incarceration and
sentence length in federal courts. On the other, research mentions the United States Sentencing
Commission not always providing the most relevant or circumstantial data to the public for
research. Reviewing what is provided and the said effort in criminal justice reform, the United
States Sentencing Commission has provided modern federal sentencing research with limited
content to work with. The limitations mentioned here will be put into a bigger perspective in
section two of this research paper. For now, we place our attention on federal criminal justice
reform acts like the Federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, The Federal Crime Bill of 1994, also
known as the Bill Clinton crime bill, and federal statues after federal court case United States v.
Booker (2005).
Section 18 U.S.C 3553(a), established criteria for sentencing in the Sentencing Reform
Act, the criteria included but is not limited to; sentencing cost efficiency, sentencing reflecting

2

severity of a crime, how to deter crime, protect the public, and how to curb recidivism. The articles
found in the SRA were incorporated to provide consistency across federal courts. However, these
same acts have been too restrictive on sentencing, leading to resistance. One argument criticizing
the United States Sentencing Commission holds that the commissions mandatory minimum
Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, 2011 report stands as a convincing argument
about the wastefulness of mandatory guidelines (Hofer, p. 2). Following the same argumentative
standpoint, Franklin and Henry address the shortcoming of United State Sentencing Commission
data between fiscal years (FY) 2010 through 2012. Their research focused on the unwarranted
racial disparities in sentencing, which are suspected to come from judicial discretion in imposing
sentences. I will touch on both arguments in section two. For now, these arguments prove relevant
to show how the guidelines have lacked empirical data proving a deterrence in sentencing
disparities. After the Crime Bill of 1994, research headed in a different direction. The Crime Bill
of 1994 was one of a multitude of crime bills that filled a large gap in research. This crime bill
held a clear disparity of its own so seeing it in action allows research to highlight extralegal
differences in treatment amongst offenders within the criminal justice system.
The Violent Crime Control Act and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, also known as the
Crime Bill of 1994, was signed into effect by President Bill Clinton to prove that the Democratic
party could take a strong stance on crime. The Crime Bill may have been signed with the intention
to curb crime but instead it placed the values of the criminal justice system into a realm of its own.
Many associate the increase in incarceration with the Federal Crime Bill. Disproportionate rates
of incarceration tell part of this story. The federal crime bill was not a trigger for mass
incarceration, but it was one of the leading bills in increasing incarceration on a federal level.
Following the Crime Bill of 1994, all fifty states had passed at least one mandatory minimum law
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(Hofer, 2019). This bill incentivized massive infrastructure reformation, federal jails and prisons
were being constructed at increasingly alarming rates. With more room for jailing and housing
inmates, incarceration rates increased in numbers and sentencing length. Other things like an
increase in death penalties and prosecution of young people as adults also occurred. For this
research, we want to focus on the incarceration rates of adults in the federal system. Twenty years
would pass before we see the first notable federal case opposing federal crime statues. The supreme
court case that turned the tide, United States v Booker (2005).
United States v Booker (2005) is a leading Supreme Court case on criminal sentencing. The
question this case addresses is whether Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth
Amendment. Defendant Booker was on trial for drug trafficking. Under mandatory guidelines,
Booker was required to serve a 210–262-month long sentence. The judge presiding over the case
later found additional evidence of Booker possessing 566 grams of crack cocaine. The jury,
unaware of this evidence, did not guarantee that this newfound evidence would authorize an
additional sentence for Booker. Based off precedent set in Blakely v Washington, the Court
concluded that the Sixth Amendment is applicable to the Sentencing Guidelines. The jury’s verdict
was not enough to authorize sentencing regarding the additional discovery of evidence. What did
this mean for the federal sentencing mandates? Justice Breyer concluded in his opinion that the
court following section 18 of the United States Commission Article 3553(b)(1), which makes the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines mandatory, is not compatible with the Sixth Amendment (Cornell
Law School). The guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial holding and modified the
guidelines to become advisory for courts in terms of sentence ranges.
Outside of the fact that Booker highlighted a violation of constitutional rights, it also began
an in-depth analysis of sentencing disparities. Prior to Booker, scholars had already begun to
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question whether race, ethnicity, gender, and socio-economic status played a role in sentencing.
Evidence outside of the guidelines has proven racial disparities within the American Criminal
Justice system. Approximately 100,000 people (about the seating capacity of the Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum) are incarcerated in local jails. In terms of race and sex, 2,272 per 100,00
black men are incarcerated in state and federal prisons. Compared to that of 392 per 100,000 white
men. Seeing these disparities exist within the study of federal sentencing alone brings the question
of whether these disparities exist when guidelines are placed into order. Intended to curb these
disparities, guidelines provide a basic rubric of federal sentencing, however cases like United
States v Booker, leaves this open to interpretation.
Now that we have established guidelines, this paper will be evaluating where systematic
disparities stem from and exist within guidelines. Within the uncovering of systematic disparities,
there will be a review of the systematic discretion, including prosecutorial and judicial discretion.
The paper will revisit how legislative action establishes guidelines and inherent discretion within
the guidelines. Concluding the research with a comprehensive examination of federal sentencing
policy. The purpose of this research is to review the literature on federal sentencing disparities and
the influence of discretion from key players within the Federal court system. With the intention of
clarifying how useful guidelines are, this research looks at the overall impact of Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.
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HEADING 2
SYSTEMATIC DISPARITIES
Frequently referenced in Federal Sentencing research, Ulmer et al. stands as a staple
piece in Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The worry Booker brought into the criminal justice
system was that it increased unwarranted disparities, proving the opposite of their intended
purpose. In March 2010, the United States Sentencing Commission, released a report showing
that racial disparity in federal sentencing lengths had increased following Booker (2005) and
another federal case, Gall v United States (2007). The United States Sentencing Commission
reported prior to Booker there was a five percent difference between black males and white
males in sentencing length. Post-Booker, this disparity jumped to a fifteen-percent difference in
sentencing length, meaning black males were more likely to receive a longer sentence for similar
crimes committed when compared to a white male (Ulmer et. al., 2011). Beginning here with the
disparity difference between a white man and a black man in the United States criminal justice
system, it would be beneficial to look at engrained systematic disparities. One of the most
notable and measurable sentencing disparities that researchers still analyze till this day, began in
the 1980’s.
Briefly mentioned before in 1984, President Ronald Reagan signed into law the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Reagan’s administration marked the beginning of a prolonged
period of increased incarceration rates, having what some may say was an adverse effect. The
number of incarcerated non-violent offenders skyrocketed. Almost immediately after the
Sentencing Reform Act was signed into law and the United States Sentencing Commission was
created, a multitude of other drug and criminal reform acts were signed into law. The War on
Drugs included many forefronts to fight anti-drug abuse laws. The most detrimental of these acts
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in the 80’s was the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 mandated a
minimum penalty for first time offenders, in violation of drug trafficking laws. Within the
parameters of this legislation, a large-scale approach on anti-drug abuse was the anti-cocaine
laws targeted towards black men in the South.
Statistics show that in 1980 there were approximately 50,000 people incarcerated on
nonviolent drug related charges. By 1997, this number increased to over 400,000 (A History of
Drug War, 2022). Those convicted of a trafficking offense were required to serve a minimum
federal time for any possession of crack cocaine over five grams, or five hundred grams or more
of powder cocaine. That sentence alone speaks a lot about the measurements placed on criminal
offenses, harmonizing with what many believed this period to be a “war on drugs.” This war on
drugs created a distinct distribution of racial and ethnic disparities, specifically focusing on
where each form of cocaine was found. To be more concise, crack cocaine was found primarily
in African American or Black communities, whereas powder cocaine was dominant in White
communities. The ratio of crack cocaine to powder cocaine in the 1980’s stood at a whooping,
100:1 ratio for mandatory minimum sentencing to be triggered for trafficking. This ratio also sets
up a mandatory minimum for nonviolent offenses like simple possession of crack cocaine. These
mandatory guidelines lead to a plethora of disproportionate punishments of low-level drugs
dealers and African Americans (Asher, 2011).
In 2012, it was estimated that 50 percent of federal incarcerations were due to drug law
violations such as possession or trafficking, this is 10 times the amount of incarceration in 1980,
before the Sentencing Reform and Anti-Drug Abuse Acts were put into motion. Although Black
or African American people only make up 13 percent of the U.S. population, they account for 30
percent of arrest for drug violations and 40 percent of black people incarcerated are in state or

7

federal prisons for drug violations (The Drug War, Mass Incarceration and Race, 2015).
Research by Everett and Wojtkiewics (2002), looks at the impact of federal sentencing
guidelines on social differences in sentencing severity. Focus is placed on race, ethnicity
incorporating legal variables, offense type, offense severity, and criminal history. Initially studies
were not finding evidence of disparities in federal sentencing guidelines. It was not until an
intersectional approach was taken that we see measurable disparities. Looking at the relationship
between race, gender, age, and sentence severity Everette and Wojtkiewics research shows
evidence of a direct link between these factors, sentence severity, and the likelihood of
incarceration.
Ulmer et al., argues extra-legal and unwarranted disparities existed post-Booker.
Following in pursuit of this argument, Everette and Wojtkiewics, analyze data to see if
unwarranted disparities are successfully controlled by guidelines, limiting the range of extralegal factors on sentencing. Their focus on sentencing due to racial and ethnic disparities places
value on where a defendant falls in terms of the first, second, third, or fourth quarter of
sentencing ranges in federal guidelines. Four extra-legal factors are taken into consideration,
gender, age, education, and alien status. This intersectional approach shows that race and
ethnicity are not the only limiting factors to affect federal sentencing length. Intertwined with
race and ethnicity, data begins to show a pattern particularly between race/ethnicity and socioeconomic status. For example, general findings of their study mention black defendants are less
likely to be convicted of an economic offense and more likely to be convicted of a drug offense
(199). Some of the most common drug offenses black defendants have been convicted are for
crack cocaine and marijuana.
Crack cocaine and marijuana regulation place black defendants at a higher disadvantage
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within the criminal justice system. This disparity has been long standing and highly
controversial, making crack cocaine convictions the key to examining federal sentencing
disparities. Fischman and Schanzenbach acknowledge this in their research. The impact of
federal sentencing guidelines shows a disparity in the treatment between crack and powder
cocaine (2012, 734). Research is now progressing to refine key measures like criminal history
and offense severity. As suggested, research analyzes how race and ethnicity have influence in
sentencing decisions. Though many would like to have believed the guidelines were serving their
proposed purpose and would decrease disparities, its efficiency cannot be defended, at least not
in its pre-Booker format. Ulmer’s suggestion of extending research to analyze how race and
ethnicity might vary by criminal history became limited sooner rather than later. To implement a
more flexible study, Franklin, and Henry ties Ulmer’s research into other research, sentencing
factors on sentencing outcomes. This approach maneuvers the variables in Ulmer’s study. The
study investigates whether an offender’s criminal history conditions affect their race and
ethnicity on sentencing outcomes, for example incarceration decisions and sentence length
decision (2020, 5).
One hypothesis tested was how a decrease in sentencing led to disadvantages as criminal
history increased. Three minority groups were accounted for, African Americans, Latino’s, and
Native American offenders’ relative to white offenders. One finding worth noting was when
Asian offenders were added to the list of minority groups to test for. Asian Americans are
commonly referred to as the “model minority.” To test other commonly stereotyped minorities
against a model minority removes the idea that disparities only exist between the majority and
minority. With this viewpoint, researchers can measure the relevancy of extra-legal factors on
other minority offenders. As Asian Americans hold this “model minority” outward reflection,
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their stereotype congruency occurred in the opposite direction when compared to other
minorities. In other words, Asian Americans were not viewed as being violent or unintelligent.
Often Asian Americans are associated with positive stereotypes. They are viewed as being
successful, intelligent, and hardworking (Franklin & Henry, 2020, as cited in, Franklin & Fearn,
2015). Unlike other minorities, Asian American conform to the idea of the model minority and
exhibit low levels of criminal history. Asian Americans also on average receive the greatest
advantage in sentencing when compared to other minorities. They are statistically like White
offenders. So, what is the difference between Asian American and other minority offenders? We
can look at extra-legal factors on sentencing decisions.
There is an argument congruent to the point made, criminal history is accounted for and
the highest amongst black defendants. Data shows on average prison sentences for black men are
40 months (about 3 and a half years) longer than for whites (McConnell & Rasul, 2018). This
same argument is mirrored in Rehavi and Starr’s text; estimates for racial disparities in federal
sentencing are explained by differences in arrest offense characteristics and preexisting
defendant characteristics. Criminal history is the primary preexisting defendant characteristic to
look at. Observing cases from the point of arrest to sentencing allows this research to pinpoint
where unexpected disparities originate in the judicial process. Doerner and Demuth use data
from the United States Sentencing Commission, to examine independent and joint effects of
extralegal factors on incarceration and sentence length in federal courts. Surely there is enough
research with a focus on extralegal factors. Continuously building off one another, researchers
have shown that disparities result in harsher sentences for black defendants compared to
similarly situated white defendants. Steffernsmeier and Demuth (2000) study was proof of this,
white defendants are least likely to be incarcerated in federal court and receive shorter sentences
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(Doerner & Demuth, 2009).
Sentencing outcomes can be relational to increased severity for minorities due to
stereotypes associated with that minority group. During the early phases of the War on Drugs,
propaganda was used to portray a negative image of African Americans. Research has not denied
nor failed to acknowledge the criminal stereotypes associated with African Americans. This is
not giving the research credit but bringing to light where gaps can be filled in. Taking what is
already hypothesized about federal sentencing in relation to extra-legal factors. Research can
work to relate empirical data from political campaigns to measure which stereotypes were
poured into the media and where these stereotypes came from. Let us not forget a bill cannot be
passed without a collective effort. Were stereotypes stemming from the judiciary, legislation, or
the executive, if not all simultaneously? Some stereotypes that have been associated with
minorities, specifically for African Americans and Latino offenders display them as being gang
affiliated and committed to street lifestyles. These stereotypes appear harmless, but data shows
bias from these characteristics.
These stereotypes initiate a spillover effect into court actor’s punishment decisions,
known as the focal concerns theory (Franklin & Henry, 2020). A court actor’s discretion when it
comes to punishment is based on three sets of focal concerns; offender blameworthiness, or
culpability, protection of the community, and practical constraints associated with a sentence.
These same focal points are related to an argument that sentencing outcomes can be more severe
for minorities whose criminal history is congruent with associated stereotypes. This argument
relates back to two perspectives previously mentioned and is embedded within additional
research. Ulmer and Laskorunsky (2016), identify Black and Latino offenders with more
criminal history can be perceived as being more dangerous and crime prone (Franklin & Henry,
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2020).
Initially this study was focused on age and gender disparities but when doing in-depth
literature review. Many studies do not measure gender and especially not age in their primary
focus of analysis. Disparities that have been found associated with the variable concluded that
older offenders tend to be sentenced more leniently than younger offenders. A study by
Steffensmeier et al. (1995) found that in Pennsylvania courts, there is evidence of older offenders
being less likely to be imprisoned than younger offenders. Peak age for sentencing severity most
can agree on, floats around the ages 21 through 27. A proposal for research, evaluating why this
is the peak age for sentencing disparity and interrelating it into other extralegal factors like race
and ethnicity, criminal history, and social status. There is speculation that pre-trial disparities are
related to socioeconomic differences, which can be closely tied to race and ethnic differences.
Examples of this can include the income and wage gaps and educational gaps between minority
offenders and white offenders. A study by Spohn and Holleran (200) articulates the research
from Steffensmeier et al., broadening the research from Pennsylvania courts to other courts
around the country. Their research reached state courts in Chicago, Miami, and Kansas City. The
general pattern of the study shows defendants who are male, black, or Hispanic, age 21 through
29, and unemployed are more likely to be incarcerated.
This may be where research intended to be, at a point where multiple extralegal factors
can be measured. Data from Doerner and Demuth’s research is consistent with another
sentencing research. Legal factors are a critical predictor of sentencing outcomes. Defendants
with more extensive criminal histories and crime severity are more likely to receive harsher
sentences than those with the opposite, less extensive criminal history and less severe offenses.
One take away from this section on research has been that legal and contextual controls such as
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race/ethnicity, gender, and age have significant independent effects on sentencing outcomes. If
research now removes the extralegal factor from the primary focus, examination of disparities
because of discretion within federal sentencing can add to a picture already being constructed.
Articles have shifted focus from extralegal factors to types of punishments under federal
sentencing guidelines. Using federal data from 2010 through 2017, Johnson, Spohn, and Kimchi
look at disparities in life without parole sentencing. Their research was organized to answer who
gets life in prison and how disparities are distributed across minority groups. Their study finds
that Black and Hispanic offenders have higher eligibility for life sentences when following the
federal guidelines. Even with a decrease in death sentences, federal guidelines follow a pattern of
increasing sentencing for life without parole. Existing literature has relied on limiting
measurements like prior convictions, felonies, and violent offenses. Assessing more robust data
on criminal history and assessing the relevancy of both race and criminal history, should provide
clarity where research has been proving open to interpretation. Evaluation of socio-economic
factors, like education level, household income, and crime rates in a defendant’s neighborhood
can add a new lens to investigate.
There is an assumption that the condition of presumptive sentence along with other
features of criminal conviction are problematic because the measurements used to determine
these processes and negotiate may contain racial disparities. Evidence points to racial disparities
existing within the conditions of the applied guidelines. To curb this side of the study, shifting
the focus to court actor’s discretion is better applicable to this paradigm of research. Rehavi and
Starr kick off this approach and argue that research needs to look at how prosecutorial influence
applies racial and ethnic disparities to federal sentencing.
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HEADING 3
SENTENCING DISCRETIONS WITHIN THE JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS
It is estimated that 95 percent of federal cases do not go to trial, many of them are settled
through plea agreements. Plea agreements are the prosecution's primary source of federal
policing that researchers have not been able to fully account for. In theory prosecutors are the
“gate keepers” of the law, ensuring that laws are properly applied and used judiciously. The
other main contributors to federal policing are judges. Federal judges use their power of
discretion to determine sentencing. Research has observed judicial discretion and the effect it has
on racial disparities in sentencing. There is suspicion that racial disparities are not only related to
judicial discretion but also to prosecutorial behavior, biases, or sentencing policies (Fischman &
Schanzenbach, 2012). The shift in debate about the power of discretion is set between two
paradigms, judiciary discretion and prosecutorial discretion.
Examination of federal sentencing guidelines looks at racial disparity changes as doctrine
changes, either to enhance or limit judicial discretion. Studies focused on unwarranted racial
disparities that were suspected to come from judicial discretion. Liberation hypothesis is one of
the thesis federal sentencing research projects have been constructed out of. The Liberation
hypothesis proposes that judicial discretion is partially dependent on the seriousness of a
criminal case. Judges are “liberated” from strict guidelines regarding legally relevant factors,
which allows space for increased discretion to influence decision-making processes (Franklin &
Henry, 2020). With judicial oversight, federal judges have the right to review plea bargaining,
charging, and cooperation decisions. Findings show that judges are less biased and typically
operate independently. Federal judges are regulated by other branches of government, but with
prestige and legitimacy are more autonomous in their judicial decision making (Barkow, 2005).
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When and if guidelines play a detrimental role in the sentence agreement from both parties, the
courts can exercise judicial discretion under the United States Sentencing Commission
Amendment clause.
Judges are required to impose sentences that are sufficient but not greater than necessary
to serve sentences. Judges are autonomous in sentencing discretion but with these discretions
comes the increased chance of a judicial decision being appealed. Their discretion is public and
can be appealed through judicial review. One evidential circumstance for unwarranted disparities
is the restrictions of discretion. Restriction of discretion arises when judges are precluded by
mandatory guidelines and required to impose the guidelines, that had not yet proven to be
effective. Guidelines provide judges with the opportunity to provide a defendant with clarity on
why the sentence is being proposed, “today sentences are more just, honest, and respectful”
(Bunin, 2009). When judges do move away from guidelines, there seems to be more benefits.
Sentencing outside of the guidelines provides information to the United State Sentencing
Commission, allowing Congress and the Commission to evolve the guidelines. In 1990 and
1991, the Sentencing Commission interviewed and surveyed district judges. Judges are split
down in the middle of the debate over sentencing disparity. Nineteen percent of judges have
assumed that sentencing disparity has remained the same. This assumption is not too farfetched,
but data shows in cases of robbery and heroin possession, convictions and disparities were
reduced under the guidelines in terms of both sentencing and time served (Bunin, 2009, p 129).
Aside from judges imposing guidelines, federal prosecutors operate as officiants of the court as
well. The argument now is that the guidelines reduced inter-judge sentencing and shifted power
to prosecutors when charging defendants and complying with plea deals. United States
Attorneys, federal prosecutors are appointed to office by the President and confirmed by
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Congress. Federal prosecutors serve as federal law enforcement agents within their judicial
district. Fischman and Schanzenbach suspect that prosecutorial behavior, biases, and sentencing
policies have a disproportionate effect on minorities (2012). Following with similar ideology,
Rehavi and Starr discuss prosecutors' advantages in unilateral decision-making over the initial
charges. Prosecutors are the ones who decide the initial charges and result of a plea agreement,
subsequent plea arrangements are up to the defendant. This court arrangement highlights where
research is questioning prosecutorial engagements. It is not a question about lack of boundaries
for a prosecutor’s authority. The question now stand is whether legal authority of prosecutors has
seemed to turn in favor of prosecutorial discretion in comparison to defendant and judicial
discretion.
One boundary in place on prosecutors is in exchange for a plea agreement, a prosecutor
cannot bring or dismiss other charges. Before guidelines, plea bargaining was not as certain
without knowing the probable outcomes of sentencing via trial. If a prosecutor or defense
attorney could predict the outcome of a case, then it would be easier to predict the sentencing
outcome as well. With guidelines in place, prosecutors and defense attorneys have a better range
to estimate the outcome of sentencing during a trial. The guidelines aid the judicial system in
decreasing uncertainty around sentencing. There is more information now being exchanged
during plea negotiations. One benefit of this is that prosecutors are granted increased control
over bargaining terms and sentencing results. When legislation verified guidelines becoming
advisory, two thirds of defendants sentenced under the old crack cocaine and powder cocaine
guidelines made appeals to have their sentences reduced and succeeded. This is opposing the
statement made by court in the past that if a sentence was ordered prior to the guidelines, then
the sentence cannot be reduced in accordance with the new guidelines (Asher, 2011). The
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primary factor affecting this would be plea agreements set between federal prosecutors and
defendants.
A lack of boundaries or in this case, lack of separation of powers amongst federal
prosecution; allows federal agents to act as law enforcement and prosecution. When prosecutors
do not take a case to trial and rely on a plea agreement, they are setting themselves up to fully
police the case. To address this Barkow suggests ways to curb abuse of prosecutorial power. This
would mean imposing a separation of functions and attention to superiors. The first part of
prosecutorial power is the combined work of federal law enforcement and prosecution. Federal
prosecutors are responsible for ensuring a proper course of action within the court system.
Separating federal prosecutors into their own jurisdiction, they are responsible for making sure
matters are not under state jurisdiction. For example, in Chamber County, Texas a person
transporting drugs of Interstate-10 will more than likely be charged and filed within a state or
district court. Now just on the other side of Interstate-10, in Jefferson County the same case is
more likely to be federally prosecuted, mandating a minimum five-year prison sentence (Bunin,
2009, p 2). These two cases highlight the critical difference between state prosecution and
federal prosecution. In Jefferson County, federal prosecution operates as a primary enforcer of
law. Under the federal prosecutor, a drug trafficker would automatically be mandated to five
years imprisonment. The five-year minimum does not even factor in other disparities like
criminal history and rate of recidivism. The line between state prosecution and federal
prosecution is thin but this has not stopped federal prosecutors from pursuing jurisdiction.
Chamber County and Jefferson County are just one example of this metaphorical yet abstract
concept of legal authority. The mandatory minimums within sentencing guidelines have
increased prosecutorial leverage, leading to more plea agreements and fewer trials. Arguing
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against the system, William Stuntz argues that in reviewing pleas, courts should require the
government to use precedence. His exact works, “point to some reasonable number of factually
similar cases in which the threatened sentence has been imposed, not just threatened (as cited in,
Barkow, 2005). Relying on precedence shifts the power dynamic back towards judicial
discretion. Precedence is a power reserved specially for judges, it can be useful for defendants as
it limits plea bargaining and charging discretion by prosecution. Another check on prosecutorial
discretion proposed by Professor Angela Davis, is where constituents review complaints brought
by the public and randomly review prosecutorial decisions as a routine check (p 912). Keeping
prosecutorial discretion in check seems counterintuitive after creating guidelines but studies are
showing an increase in power. Not only has discretion increased, but guilty pleas have also
increased, trials have decreased, and mandatory punishment allows prosecutors to set the terms
of a sentence (p 921).
To look at how cases are processed within a prosecutor's office, Braniff offers a supply
and demand model, in this case the supply and demand are prosecutorial crime and resources.
The Supply and Demand model states that if there is an influx in supply and demand, it will lead
to an effect on the price of the “product.” In terms of prosecutorial crime, the resources of
prosecutorial crime can affect sentences imposed (1993). The article uses a case example
pertaining to illegal immigration at the San Diego-Mexico-U.S. Border. First, I want to mention
that the case of San Diego prosecution is beneficial to the study as immigration is not a topic
typically covered under federal sentencing disparities. It may be that Hispanic and Latino are
measurable subjects in terms of measuring unwarranted disparities but not in relation to what
kind of crimes they are charged with. It also proves to be a solid case example as the differences
between public defenders and prosecutors in San Diego vary.
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Defense attorneys in San Diego believe there are not enough resources to deal with the
crime problem, making it impossible to fully comply with sentencing guidelines without
“declining a large number of cases” (Braniff, 1993, p 4). On the other side, prosecutors in San
Diego state that the number of cases is manageable and can be negotiated on an individual level
without referencing or interfering with another case. I will not get into the whole debate on
whether prosecutor offices have allocated resources to deal with increasing cases, but evidence
alone suggests that the current judicial system is overridden with cases and an increasing
incarcerated population. Illegal immigration at the U.S-Mexico Border in San Diego, shows
there may be a shortage of supply in district judges, there are not enough judges to process
incoming federal cases. So how would one fill the gap? By relying on prosecutorial plea
agreements. Luckily for them, federal prosecutors retain discretion to charge and plea bargain to
fit with any local conditions. In this case the conditions would be processing illegal immigration
cases.
This debate over institutional discretion remains two sided. Conflicting one another,
judges are required to impose sentences that are sufficiently but not greater than necessary to
achieve the purpose of sentencing. Whereas federal prosecutors have been advised by the
Department of Justice to seek the harshest sentence possible (Bunin 2009). When pushing for the
harshest sentence, prosecutors are more likely to push for guilty plea, cooperation, and
punishment of defendant who do choose to go to trial. The disparities are not apparent but the
exercise of discretion from prosecutors stems from their legal tactics like the ones previously
mentioned, plea bargaining, coercion, and initial charges. Aside from these disparities, the
guidelines do allow judges the opportunity to explain to a defendant why they were sentenced
the way they were. Any sentencing outside of the guidelines provides feedback to the United
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State Sentencing Commission, which allows them and Congress the opportunity to evolve the
guidelines. One remaining institutional factor is Congressional influence. Being one of the first
to suggest guidelines, legislators have played a significant role in establishing Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. More important regulation than that suggested by judicial actors.
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HEADING 4
LEGISLATIONS ROLE IN FEDERAL SENTENCING
Up to this point, research has addressed the issues of race, ethnic biases, and unwarranted
disparities within federal sentencing. The starting point for this topic of the paper will address the
legitimacy of the United States Sentencing Commission (U.S.S.C) created by Congress. One
research strategy has included reviewing guidelines as an effort of Congress to limit judicial
discretion. Guidelines were put into effect beginning November of 1987. Congress had assumed
because the guidelines had been passed that the Sentencing Reform Act would apply to all
sentencing procedures thereafter, this was not confirmed though. Guidelines were not fully
adopted on the state level until January 1989.
Outside of passing the bill establishing federal sentencing guidelines, legislators created
the United States Sentencing Commission. As an effort to address potential biases in the political
process, decision making authority can be insulated relative to a sentencing commission
(Barkow, 2009). State and federal agencies have used a host in several jurisdictions to set
sentencing policies, one of the primary agencies that legislation has used is the United State
Sentencing Commission. Making the commission one of the most politically used tools in federal
sentencing. The Sentencing Reform Act requires that three members of the United State
Sentencing Commission be federal judges and no more than four commissioners can be from the
same political party. This is one of the better judgement calls to reduce polarization and
partisanship in federal sentencing policy. After full implementation of both, research on federal
sentencing took off. One area research did lack for years was in the concentration of legislative
influence on sentencing guidelines. Moving towards a new objective, research has found its hand
in legislative reformation of federal sentencing guidelines.
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Hofer describes the commission as an independent agency in the judicial branch, or
ideally as a hybrid institution that extends itself between the three branches of government.
Taking in its authority, the Sentencing Commission gives two reasons why guidelines should be
followed. First, the guidelines give advice to judicial actors through reasoned administrative
procedures outlined by the Sentencing Reform Act. The second reason is that the guidelines
represent the political will of Congress (Hofer, 2012). Pulling its legitimacy from legislators, the
commission stands as a hybrid agency to assist with political influence over judicial actors. The
Sentencing Commission imposes its power through a notice-and-comment approach to
rulemaking. A downside of the notice-and-comment approach is it does not encourage face-toface interaction and exchanges of ideas. Producing little to no collaboration between the
sentencing commission and the judiciary. The notice-and-comment approach of rulemaking
primarily benefits the commission and congress. This approach allows the commission to
exchange ideas and draft proposed rules without consulting judicial authorities (Howard-Nicolas,
2013). The opinion of the commission was that open discretion from the judiciary allowed for
unwarranted disparities. Both state and federal actors disfavored this open-ended approach to
sentencing, hinting at a correlation between legislative action and the creation of federal
guidelines.
Countering this argument, an analysis by Ryan King shows that when judges are given
discretion to follow mandated guidelines, they are flexible and fully open to the merits of a case.
Meaning they are still likely to impose the harshest sentence possible for serious offenses and
better able to distinguish between real and non-real threats to public safety (2005). The United
States Sentencing Commission has brought its own legitimacy into question with so many
provisional changes to the mandated guidelines. For example, while Congress was generating

22

penalties for crack cocaine and powder cocaine charges (keeping in mind the disproportionate
ratio), a former Counselman of the House of Judiciary Subcommittee stated, “numbers were
being pulled out of the air with no empirical evidence, it was the craziest political power game”
(King & Mauer, 2005). The commissions recommended a 5:1 ratio for crack cocaine to powder
cocaine, which Congress did not support, and instead proposed an 18:1 ratio which was
eventually adopted into policy practice. These modes of measurement are set by standards
associated with federal guidelines. Other recommendations by the sentencing commission have
included reform to keep states from exceeding prison capacity. This recommendation does not
seem to be one that the prison system takes heed of.
Seeing how legislation and executive order have now affected the judiciary, researchers
have a better idea of additional actors in policies concentrated on sentencing. State expenditures
on correction entered the billions between the years 1985 and 2019. A steady increase in
incarceration cost proves that incarceration is a numbers game to legislators. At the federal level,
sentencing policies from the War on Drugs resulted in an increase in incarceration. From the year
1980 when the War on Drugs took effect, 2019 the U.S. prison population for drug charges has
increased tenfold. In 1980, 40,900 Americans were incarcerated on drug related charges. By
2019, 430,926 were incarcerated on federal drug offenses. Sentencing length increased three
times in length, with an average of a 62-month sentence (The Sentencing Project). The
Sentencing Project, who studies the cost of imprisonment and recidivism, finds that lengthy
sentences are ineffective when it comes to preventing crime. Congress would argue that this is
not true, with little interest in the cost of federal imprisonment compared to state legislators, the
budget spent on crime does not motivate Congress to make any progressive changes. Barkow
relates this point back to proposed bill LIFER (Life Imprisonment for Egregious Recidivist) by
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former United States representative Bob Livingston. In the proposed bill, Livingston spent no
time discussing the cost and tradeoff of his proposal. His bill reflected a general Congressional
view, their primary concern is to avert crime, the effort spent to save a life overrules other
concerns. The objective is not focused on statistics, only numbers, lives, and quality of those
lives (Barkow, 2009). If it were focused on statistics, legislators would know that federal
imprisonment is not curbing recidivism. In 1994, Vincent and Hofer research data showed that
the Bureau of Prison estimated a 70 percent growth in federal prison population, because of
longer sentences for drug related offenses (Free, 1997). Without statistics, the reliance on
numbers focuses on averted crimes and not the cost and benefits of increasing sentencing.
When adjusting legislation to become more effective in terms of federal crime politics,
there is the issue of authority. Harvard Law Professor William Stuntz recognizes this issue early
on. His argument is that efforts to constitutionalize and reform criminal procedure are countered
by changes in substantive criminal law. In the 1960’s and 1970’s when courts were more liberal
leaning, criminal defendant procedural rights expanded. Unfortunately, the right to enforce this
expansion was halted by conservative legislators, undermining judicial development (Etienne,
2004). Arguing a connection between criminal defense advocacy and federal sentencing policy,
Etienne shows how federal sentencing can adversely target certain groups. Legislative disparities
are just as prevalent in sentencing disparity just as judicial disparities are.
The direct connection between the two stems from the fact that the guidelines were created
to or as they say “justify,” micromanagement of federal judges by the Sentencing Commission.
Apart of this “micromanagement,” the commission studies four statutory evaluations following
mandated guidelines. Implementation study examining the operation of the guidelines, guideline
impact on sentencing disparity, use of incarceration, and prosecutorial discretion and plea
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bargaining. When the guidelines were created, the sentencing commission was advised to create a
neutral policy statement. The intention behind this was to create a policy that did not target an
offender's race, sex, national origin, creed, or socioeconomic status (Heaney, 1991, as cited in
Free, 1997).
Research suggests creating an alternative commission that would be free from institutional
influence and restraints from Congress and the Judiciary. The current United State Sentencing
Commission is restricted to statutory regulation and minimums set by Congress. An alternative
commission would have the authority to draft guidelines that are empirically reviewed through
research and negotiations from stakeholders (Howard-Nicolas, 2013). State level sentencing
commissions are ideal models for the federal commission, as many states have effective guidelines
in place.
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HEADING 5
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY
In theory the Federal Sentencing Guidelines would be a “one stop shop” to effectively
implement sentencing policy. Its attribution to federal sentencing guidelines was one aimed at
decreasing unwarranted disparity and rates of recidivism. Changes in law over the years seemed
to mitigate disparities and supported a system that was more equal in sentencing distribution. It is
not exactly the guidelines themselves that are reducing racial disparities in sentencing; policy
reformation and judicial discretion are the two most key factors in reducing sentencing disparity.
Policies have not been effectively changed on the federal level but researchers who have
examined sentencing policy on the state level have found that state legislation is contributing to
the decline in disparity.
One of the first effects of guideline changes at the federal level was the reduction and
amendment of sentencing related to crack cocaine. Effective March 3, 2008, The United States
Sentencing Commission amended section 2D1.1. Granting sentencing amendments for well over
25,000 incarcerated individuals. Under this amendment, by law there are two conditions that
must be met as described in Article 18 of the United States Sentencing Commission 3652 © 2 for
a defendant to be granted a motion to appeal their sentencing. The problem the Sentencing
Commission had with their amendment was that those who were sentenced under plea agreement
must abide by that basis for sentencing. They cannot rely on amended guidelines, as a plea
agreement is a binding “contract” made between the defendant and federal prosecutors. This
points back to the discretion level of prosecutors. Under federal guidelines, the commission does
not take the step to reform and amend bindings set by the prosecution. As you may recall, three
members of the commission are federal judges, this inability to amend sentences just gives one
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more example of judicial discretion shifting to prosecutorial discretion. The United States
Commission has the authority to reduce prison terms and amend guidelines, but there is little to
no explanation on why they may not choose to do so. As a guide to see how the commission can
amend guidelines in a non-partisan manner, looking at state amended guidelines stands as a base
foundation.
The state of Washington has a statutory administrative, Sentencing Guidelines
Commission in place known as the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission. This
administrative office was constructed to design and develop sentencing guidelines that are
“presumptive only” This presumptive nature of the commission allows judges to apply their
discretion when imposing sentences geared toward a departure from set legal standards and rules.
The Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission consists of twenty voting members,
judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, law enforcement office, elected officials, victims'
advocates, and civilians. This is a switch from the foundation set within the United States
Sentencing Commission. The Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission engages in
the community and interviews victims of crime, taking a more hands on approach to policy
reform. Voting members can use this information to come up fair policies that address
incarceration and mandatory prison sentences (Howard-Nicolas, 2013). This method of
rulemaking is known as the negotiation rulemaking approach. Comparing the negotiation
rulemaking approach to the notice and comment approach utilized by the Federal Sentencing
Commission, we can see the effectiveness of one in comparison to the other.
The negotiated rulemaking allows stake holders the opportunity to directly contribute to
the development of regulation before it is implemented. The community is allowed to comment
on and address proposals before they are implemented into law. Negotiated rulemaking
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encourages collaboration between stakeholders and community members, whom the policies
directly affect. A platform is generated not only to address policy issues but also to find
solutions, increase community participation in decision making, promote rule improvement,
reduces litigation, and improves level of compliance (Howard-Nicolas, 2013, p 679). The
guidelines set by the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission appear to be more
adaptable and ideal in guidelines settings. State guidelines can be used as a starting prompt for
federal guidelines. Direct influences of the state guidelines have been beneficial in proposing
fewer restrictions on the three-strike rule, place mandatory minimums toward violent crimes like
murder, assault, and rape. For less offensive crimes, the Washington Commission has placed
alternatives like rehabilitation, community supervision, community supervision, and restitution
for defendants.
The most notable difference from the Washington Commission and the United States
Sentencing Commission stands in the fact that the Washington Commission is not judicial or
prosecutorial heavy in relation to discretion. Discretion is shared amongst stakeholders and
representatives vary amongst these stakeholders. Choosing a more representative body to be on
the Washington State Commission allows for a more inclusive body that reflects the
neighborhood, race, and social classes that are affected by the criminal justice system (HowardNicolas, 2013). There is one case that weakens the argument for the Washington State
Sentencing Commission, and it is within Blakely v Washington. In Blakely v Washington, a
provision in the Washington State sentencing guidelines was struck down. The guidelines
permitted a judge, when deciding whether to enhance a sentence above the guidelines range, to
consider factors that had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt in front of a jury (King,
2005, p 134). Compared to the strike down of multiple articles under the guidelines set by the
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United States Sentencing Commission, states are still ahead of the federal government in
criminal justice reform.
For example, Washington has now passed a drug treatment diversion program, this
program became a stand in, middle ground approach to address being tougher on sentencing,
while also not increasing the cost of imprisonment (Barkow, 2005). If research has not explained
in what capacity states are implementing guidelines standards, they are surely measuring the
effects of those in action. Everett and Wojtkiewicz findings show that Minnesota sentencing
guidelines measure the differences that attribute to sentencing disparities. Research on
Pennsylvania’s guidelines have provided similar data as well. Initial studies did not find
disparities in federal sentencing guidelines but after reevaluation, looking at the
interrelationships between race, gender, age, and sentence severity. Research using these
variables has shown evidence of a direct link between the factors, sentence severity, and the
likelihood of incarceration (Everett & Wojtkiewicz, 2002). Aside from using state guidelines as
alternative proposals for resetting federal guidelines, overall cost and benefits analysis are
necessary.
A cost and benefit analysis brings attention to proxies used for political interest, civil
liberties, and interest of political actors, defendants, and victims of crime. Alternatives to
guidelines have been questioned on whether they would be equally effective, more effective, or
less effective than those already in place. The cost and benefits analysis are both a fiscal debate
and a civil liberties debate. One general aspect of cost and benefit states have begun to take to
reduce incarceration rates and sentence lengths was by repealing laws that established mandatory
minimum sentences. In Kansas, one policy requires treatment instead of incarceration for firsttime nonviolent drug offenders (Barkow, 2005). This was an approach to combat the crack
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cocaine, powder cocaine disparity. This alternative to petty crime was figured out without a
sentencing guideline, goes to show that alternatives to imprisonment can be considered without
the need for guidelines. Additionally, states have recommended new policy reform to keep states
from exceeding prison capacity.
Cost-Benefits-Analyses by Paul Hofer asses the cost of prison maintenance and the cost
of offenders being released, to see how policy should be moving forward. Incarceration for
defendants who are most “crime-prone” can provide proper rehabilitation, crime deterrence, and
research when resources are properly allocated. The analysis can allow the United States
Sentencing Commission to properly weigh the cost of policy changes in comparison to economic
sanctions. Doing this would allow the commission to save money and deter crime. In 2010, it
cost over 25,000 U.S. dollars to incarcerate just one inmate in the federal prison system. Now
comparatively evaluate this cost to the 200,000 prisoners in custody at federal correctional
facilities (Howard-Nicolas, 2013). That means the average cost for federal imprisonment is
approximately 5 million dollars. Now researchers are questioning if length sentences have long
term benefits for defendants who are convicted as drug traffickers, 10 percent of defendants
incarcerated are imprisoned for drug-related offenses. Although the Sentencing Reform Act
establishes that sentencing should be cost effective and reflecting the seriousness of the crime.
Research has not shown adequate data that this criterion has been met, sentencing
guidelines do not vary between current incidences in the community and nation. One of the
largest disparities in sentencing data seems to come from prosecutorial power. For reference,
William Stunz suggests courts should require the government to use similar cases where a
sentence has been imposed when there is a discrepancy between judges and prosecutors in how
to rule on a case (Barkow, 2005). Greater administrative and institutional checks could decrease
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the lack of separation of power amongst judicial actors. Allowing for a decrease in unchecked
abuses of power and greater civil rights for federal defendants. This is just another routine policy
check of the power balance, that could prove beneficial to the judicial system.
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HEADING 6
CONCLUSION
With guidelines becoming advisory following the outcome of Booker, observing
disparities within the federal sentencing becomes limited. Existing research has relied on limiting
measurements like prison sentences, felonies, and violent offenses. Other limiting measurements
include race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and judicial and prosecutorial discretion. Research
could move away from measuring disparities in sentencing, to using agency data to analyze
disparities from the initial point of arrest through sentencing. Doing so would allow research to
analyze the entire incarceration process, pinpointing where discrepancies in data and disparities
stem from. Researchers have been presumptive in assuming that only race and ethnicity play a
role in sentencing disparities. Only utilizing these variables alone can be problematic when used
to determine federal processes. Research questions whether disparities are results of actor
discretion or disparities that applied within the sentencing guidelines.
Legal scholars, judges, and practitioners of law primarily agree that prosecutorial
discretion has played an influential role in determining sentencing (Gilbert & Johnson 1996;
Miller 2004; Stith 2008, as cited in Rehavi & Starr 2014). Legal factors are important predictors
of sentencing outcomes, but they are not the only predictors. Results show that legal factors like
race and ethnicity, gender, and age mostly have an independent effect on sentencing outcomes.
Filling in the gap, it will be important to consider which dependent factors influence sentencing
outcomes. Expansion of this topic can extend to assessing judicial biases, prosecutorial power,
and, or legislative influence of criminal justice policies.
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